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Employment Discrimination

by Peter Reed Corbin*
and John E. Duvall**
Continuing the trend begun with the 2003 survey period, the 2004
survey period experienced a significant decrease in the number of
decisions by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the area of
employment discrimination.' On the other hand, the United States
Supreme Court decided several noteworthy decisions in the employment
arena. In PennsylvaniaState Police v. Suders,2 the Court addressed the
important issue of whether the EllerthIFaragheraffirmative defense'
in hostile work environment sexual harassment cases is available when
the plaintiff alleges that she was constructively discharged.4 In General
Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline,5 the Court, in another victory for
employers, ruled that claims of so-called "reverse discrimination" are not

Partner in the firm of Ford & Harrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. University of
Virginia (B.A., 1970); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
1975). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Florida.
** Partner in the firm of Ford & Harrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. Florida State
University (B.S., 1973); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1985). Member, State Bar of Florida.
1. This Article covers significant cases in the area of employment discrimination law
decided by the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
during 2004. Cases arising under the following federal statutes are included: Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (2000)); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA") (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000)); the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA") (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113 (2000)); and the Civil Rights
Acts of 1866 and 1871 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2000)).
2. 124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004).
3. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775 (1998).
4. Pennsylvania State Police, 124 S. Ct. at 2355-57.
5. 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
*
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available in claims made pursuant to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"). 6
I.
A.

TITLE VII

OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF

1964

Jurisdictionand Coverage Under the Act

1. Definition of "Employee." The requirement that a plaintiff fall
within the statutory definition of "employee" is fundamental to coverage
under Title VII. v In Cuddeback v. Florida Board of Education,' the
issue before the court was whether a graduate student research
assistant met the Title VII definition of "employee."9 Plaintiff was a
graduate student at the University of South Florida who conducted
laboratory cancer research while completing her doctoral dissertation.
During her first year of work, plaintiff was told by her professor "that
she was his best student."' ° From that point forward, however,
plaintiff's professor began expressing concerns about plaintiff's attendance, lab notebooks, and lack of communication. Ultimately, these
concerns led to the non-renewal of plaintiff's appointment. Plaintiff then
filed a complaint under Title VII, alleging gender discrimination. The
university filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that plaintiff
was a student, not an employee, so Title VII did not apply. The district
court disagreed with the university's argument and found that plaintiff
was an employee. Nevertheless, the court granted the summary
judgment motion because plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case
of discrimination."
On appeal, the primary issue was whether plaintiff met the statutory
definition of "employee." In resolving this issue, the court of appeals
relied upon the "economic realities" test adopted by the court's prior
decision in Cobb v. Sun Papers,Inc." The court in Cuddeback held the
following factors favored treating plaintiff as an employee under Title
VII: (1) plaintiff received a stipend (waiver of tuition in the amount of
$15,000) and benefits for her work; (2) plaintiff received sick and annual
leave; (3) plaintiff's relationship with the university was governed by a
collective bargaining agreement; (4) plaintiff was provided equipment

6. Id. at 591; 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
8. 381 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2004).
9. Id. at 1234; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
10. Cuddeback, 381 F.3d at 1232.
11. Id. at 1232-33.
12. Id. at 1234; 673 F.2d 337 (11th Cir. 1982).
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and training by the university; and (5) "the decision not to renew
[plaintiff's] appointment was based on employment reasons ... rather

than academic reasons.""3 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's ruling that plaintiff was a Title VII employee. 4
Despite concluding plaintiff was an employee, the appellate court
affirmed the district court's finding that plaintiff had not established
5
that she was discriminated against on account of her gender.'
2. Disparate Treatment. Part of the plaintiff's burden of proof in
a disparate treatment action is establishing she was subjected to an
"adverse employment action" by an employer.'" This issue was before
the court in Lindsey v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway. 7
Plaintiff brought a lawsuit against defendant railroad alleging gender
discrimination in violation of Title VII. Specifically, plaintiff contended
that junior male employees were recalled for temporary work assignments before she was. However, the evidence established that plaintiff
had filed an internal grievance over this issue and had been fully
compensated through the railroad's grievance process. The district court
found that plaintiff had not suffered an adverse employment action, and
accordingly, granted summary judgment for the railroad.'" On appeal,
the Eleventh Circuit, citing its prior decision in Davis v. Town of Lake
Park,9 held that a plaintiff must prove that she was subjected to "a
serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment" to establish an adverse employment action.2 ° Applying
this standard to plaintiff in Lindsey, the court concluded that plaintiff
had suffered no tangible harm and had not suffered an adverse
employment action because she had been compensated through the
railroad's internal grievance procedure for the times that junior male
employees had been called ahead of her for temporary work assignments.' Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision.22

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Cuddeback, 381 F.3d at 1234.
Id. at 1235.
Id. at 1236.
Rice-Lamar v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 232 F.3d 836, 842-43 (11th Cir. 2000).
No. 03-13079, 2004 WL 443773 (l1th Cir. Mar. 8, 2004).
Id. at *1.
245 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2001).
Lindsey, 2004 WL 443773, at *2 (quoting Davis, 245 F.3d at 1239).
Id.
Id.
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In Wilson v. B IE Aerospace, Inc.,2 the primary issue before the
Eleventh Circuit was whether the alleged statements by defendant's
management constituted so-called "direct evidence" of discriminatory
B/E Aerospace, Inc., a manufacturer of airplane cabin
motive.24
interior products, located in Delray Beach, Florida, hired plaintiff as an
Plaintiff subsequently received
engineering business manager.
promotions to the positions of Engineering Manager and then Engineering Director within the company's Interior Systems Group ("ISG").
Thereafter, plaintiff expressed an interest in being considered for the
position of Site Vice President." Plaintiff allegedly was told by her
supervisor that she was "the obvious candidate" for this position, and
"even though women aren't typically in that type of position we'll see
what happens when we throw your name out there to corporate."26 The
position was awarded to a male candidate, allegedly because plaintiff
was not fully qualified for the position.2
Over a year later, plaintiff was asked to move her office closer to the
majority of employees that she supervised. Plaintiff initially protested
this move but eventually agreed to do so. Plaintiff packed the contents
of her office, closed the blinds, locked the door, took most of her personal
belongings home, and left the facility. It appeared to plaintiff's
supervisor that she had vacated her office and quit. When plaintiff was
later contacted and asked to explain her actions, she stated that she had
simply packed her office in preparation for moving it. Plaintiff's
supervisor did not believe this story and terminated plaintiff for
insubordination. Plaintiff filed an action pursuant to Title VII alleging
gender discrimination, both with respect to her not being promoted to
vice president and with respect to her termination. The district court
granted summary judgment for the employer.2"
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit focused on whether the alleged
comments by plaintiff's supervisor constituted direct evidence of a
The court of appeals noted that direct
discriminatory motive.29
evidence included "'only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could
mean nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of' some impermissible factor."30 The court noted that the comment that plaintiff was

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

376 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1085.
Id. at 1084.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1085.
Id. at 1086.
Id. (quoting Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342 n.2 (11th Cir. 2002)).
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"the obvious choice" for promotion was neutral, not evidence of a
With respect to the supervisor's comdiscriminatory intent.3 1
ment-"even though women aren't typically in that type of position," the
court determined that the statement could allow an inference of
discrimination, but the statement could also be interpreted as merely an
observation of fact. 32 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the
comments did not constitute direct evidence of discrimination. 3
The court also concluded that the comments, in the context of the
circumstantial evidence model of proof, created a disputed issue of
material fact on whether defendant's articulated reason for not
promoting plaintiff (i.e., that she was not qualified) was simply a pretext
Accordingly, the court of appeals
for a discriminatory motive. 34
reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment with respect to
the promotion claim. 35 However, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision regarding the termination claim, which did not
occur until over a year later, because her termination was too remote in
time to allow a reasonable inference of discrimination. 6
3. Sexual Harrassment. Perhaps the most significant decision
handed down by the United States Supreme Court during the survey
period was Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders.37 Plaintiff worked as
a police communications operator for the Pennsylvania State Police.
Over a period of approximately five months, three of plaintiff's male
supervisors subjected her to a barrage of sexual comments, obscene
gestures, and the like. Plaintiff eventually resigned without having filed
a complaint in compliance with defendant's sexual harassment policy.
She subsequently brought an action pursuant to Title VII, alleging that
she had been subjected to sexual harassment and constructively
discharged from her position.
The district court granted summary judgment for defendant on the
basis of the Ellerth /Faragheraffirmative defense. The court found that
defendant exercised reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment by
maintaining a policy prohibiting such conduct, and that plaintiff had
unreasonably failed to take advantage of defendant's complaint

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id. at 1086-87.
Id. at 1083.
Id. at 1091.
Id. at 1092.
Id.
124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004).
Id. at 2348.
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procedure.39 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the
employer was strictly liable and that a constructive discharge constituted a tangible employment action.4" Thus the EllerthIFaragherdefense
was unavailable. 4 '
In a victory for employers, the Supreme Court vacated the Third
Circuit's strict liability holding.4 2 The Court concluded the Ellerth/
Faragher affirmative defense is available in a constructive discharge
scenario.4 3 An exception exists when the constructive discharge is
caused by a supervisor's official act such as a "humiliating demotion,
extreme cut in pay, or transfer to a position in which [plaintiff] would
44
face unbearable working conditions."
In the "easy-to-decide" category was the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Hulsey v. Pride Restaurants, LLC.45 The seventeen year-old plaintiff
was hired to work at a Burger King restaurant in Jasper, Alabama. Her
manager was only twenty or twenty-one years old. Almost as soon as
she was hired, plaintiff's manager expressed a desire to date her. When
she turned him down, plaintiff was transferred to the night shift, where
she was the only female employee on the shift. Plaintiff's manager
continued to ask her out. When plaintiff continued to refuse, her
manager began to relentlessly proposition her for sex, trying to put his
hand down her shirt and touch her breast. On at least two occasions, he
even tried to pull her pants down while other male employees were
holding plaintiff and laughing at her. One evening, plaintiff asked if she
could go on break to have dinner with members of her family in the
restaurant.4 6 Her manager replied that "'the only way you can go on
47
Plaintiff rejected this
break is if I get into your pants after work.'"
offer. As she walked from behind the counter to tell her family goodbye,
48
When
her manager told her that she "'might as well clock out."'
a
break,
for
plaintiff asked whether he meant that she should clock out
9
her manager replied: "[No, you're fired."
Plaintiff never filed a complaint pursuant to the company's sexual
harassment policy. The day after she was fired, however, she filed a

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 2348-49.
Id. at 2344.
Id. at 2350.
Id. at 2357.
Id. at 2347.
Id.
367 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1242.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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complaint with the local police department. Plaintiff also filed an action
pursuant to Title VII alleging sexual harassment. The district court
entered summary judgment for the employer, providing a two-sentence
order that provided no basis for the court's decision (other than generally
adopting the reasons set forth in defendant's motion).5 °
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit had little difficulty holding that the
district court "should not have thrown out [plaintiff's] case without a
trial."5 The appellate court concluded that dismissal was inappropriate whether plaintiff's claim was viewed pursuant to a tangible52
employment action theory or a hostile work environment theory.
Pursuant to a tangible employment action theory, the court determined
that it was immaterial whether plaintiff ever took advantage of
defendant's harrassment policy because the EllerthIFaragheraffirmative
defense is not available in such cases.5" Likewise, with respect to a
hostile work environment theory, the court agreed that the conduct of
plaintiff's manager was sufficient to meet the threshold inquiry of
whether the conduct was objectively severe and pervasive.54 The court
summarily rejected defendant's argument that the conduct at issue
constituted nothing more than "'childish horseplay between teenagers."'55 The court noted plaintiff's manager "was not a teenager" and
further noted that "this was not horseplay."56 Thus, the district court's
grant of summary judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded
for further proceedings.57
4. Retaliation. In Stavropoulos v. Firestone," the Eleventh Circuit
again addressed the issue of whether plaintiff had suffered an "adverse
employment action," this time in the context of a retaliation action.5 9
Plaintiff worked as an assistant professor at the University of Georgia
School of Art. Plaintiff was selected with five other professors to screen
applicants and recommend a candidate to fill a computer artist position.
Plaintiff believed that a female candidate, Dr. LeBanc, was the most
qualified. A majority of the committee, however, favored hiring a male

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 1243.
Id. at 1240.
Id. at 1244.
Id. at 1245.
Id. at 1247-48.
Id. at 1248.
Id.
Id. at 1249.
361 F.3d 610 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 612.
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applicant."° Plaintiff perceived this as unfair, and, on one occasion,
manifested her disagreement by "yelling and shaking her fists at her
fellow committee members."6 1 Plaintiff also assisted Dr. LeBanc in
sending a letter to the University's Legal Affairs Department, stating
that Dr. LeBanc may have been a victim of gender discrimination in the
selection process.62 Thereafter, the faculty voted not to renew plaintiff's
contract because plaintiff "was not collegial but was insulting and hostile
to her fellow faculty members.""
The deans rejected the faculty vote because plaintiff generally had
received favorable performance evaluations. Perhaps not surprisingly,
plaintiff received a negative rating on her next performance evaluation.
The following year, the faculty again voted not to renew plaintiff's
contract. Plaintiff then filed a grievance with the faculty senate. After
a hearing before the faculty senate grievance panel, at which plaintiff
was represented by an attorney, the panel issued a report concluding
that the faculty had improperly voted not to renew plaintiff's contract
based on her sex. The panel retained plaintiff in her position with no
loss of pay or benefits. Notwithstanding this decision, plaintiff filed an
action raising several claims, including a Title VII claim for retaliation.
The district court granted summary judgment for the university."
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit focused on whether plaintiff had
suffered an adverse employment action, an essential element in
establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. 5 The key issue was
whether the actions plaintiff complained of rose to the level of "substantiality."66 The Eleventh Circuit concluded:
Here, the acts [plaintiffi complains of ultimately had no effect on her
employment status. Though agents of [defendant] rated her negatively
and voted to terminate her, other agents of [defendant] overrode the
votes, keeping [plaintiff] in her position, with the same pay and
benefits. Thus, these acts were not objectively serious and tangible
enough to be adverse employment actions.67
Accordingly, because plaintiff had failed to show that she was subjected
to an adverse employment action, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id. at 613.
Id.
Id.

64. Id. at 613-15.
65. Id. at 616.
66. Id. at 617.
67. Id.
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district court's ruling that she had failed to establish a prima facie case
of retaliation under Title VII.68

In Gregory v. Georgia Department of Human Resources,69 the issue
before the court was whether plaintiff's retaliation claim was barred
because it had not been specifically referenced in the administrative
charge plaintiff had previously filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").7 ° Plaintiff, an African-American
doctor, had worked as a staff psychiatrist at the Southwestern State
Hospital operated by the Georgia Department of Human Resources.
Following plaintiff's termination, she brought a retaliation action
At trial, plaintiff introduced evidence of
pursuant to Title VII.7
disparate treatment on account of race and evidence that her Caucasian
supervisor, after firing plaintiff, stated to other minority employees,
"'[T]his is what happens when you mess with a privileged white male
entered a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the
like me."' 72 The jury
3
amount of $10,000.1

On appeal, the only issue before the Eleventh Circuit was whether
plaintiff's retaliation claim was administratively barred because she had
neither checked the box denoting retaliation on her administrative
charge form nor specifically referenced retaliation in the allegations of
her charge.74 Applying the well-established standard originally set
forth in Sanchez v.StandardBrands, Inc.," the Eleventh Circuit held
that plaintiff's claim was not barred, regardless of whether the
retaliation allegations were "like or related" to the allegations set forth
in the charge.7" The court concluded that plaintiff's retaliation
allegations were "inexplicably intertwined" with her complaints of race
discrimination set forth in the charge, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision even though plaintiff had neglected to check
the retaliation box on the charge form.77

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 618.
355 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1278.
Id.
Id. at 1279.
Id. at 1278.
Id.
431 F.2d 455, 467 (5th Cir. 1970).
Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1280.
Id.
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Defenses to Title VII Actions

1. Judicial Estoppel. In Parker v. Wendy's International,Inc.,7"
the Eleventh Circuit continued its trend of interesting decisions by
addressing the impact of a plaintiff's bankruptcy upon the plaintiff's
employment discrimination claim. 79 Plaintiff had filed a race discrimination action against Wendy's pursuant to Title VII. During the
pendency of this action, plaintiff and her husband filed a petition for
relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. ° Plaintiff, however,
omitted any mention of the Title VII action in the bankruptcy petition
and schedules filed under oath in the bankruptcy case. After the
bankruptcy was closed out, the bankruptcy trustee learned of the
discrimination action. The trustee moved the bankruptcy court to
reopen the bankruptcy case and also moved to intervene in the
discrimination action. Both motions were granted. The district court,
however, applying the Eleventh Circuit's prior decision in Burnes v.
Pemco Aeroplex, Inc. , ruled that the discrimination claims were barred
by the doctrine of judicial estoppel because plaintiff had failed to disclose
her discrimination suit in her bankruptcy filings."2
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the real
party in interest in this case, the bankruptcy trustee, had not made any
prior inconsistent statements to the courts, so the doctrine of judicial
estoppel did not apply."
Interestingly, the court also included the
following dictum, calling into question the correctness of the court's prior
decision in Burnes:
The correct analysis here compels the conclusion that judicial estoppel
should not be applied at all. Moreover, based on our analysis which
follows, it is questionable as to whether judicial estoppel was correctly
applied in Burnes. The more appropriate defense in the Burnes case
was, instead, that the debtor lacked standing."'
The rationale for the above conclusion, according to the court, was that
a pre-petition action is considered part of the property of the bankruptcy

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

365 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1269.
Id. at 1270.
291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002).
Parker,365 F.3d at 1269-70.
Id. at 1269.
Id. at 1272.
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estate, and the trustee in bankruptcy is considered the only proper party
with standing to pursue the claim."
2. Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel. In EEOC v. Pemco Aeroplex,
Inc.,6 the issue before the court was whether the EEOC was barred
from bringing a Title VII racial harassment action when there had been
a prior adverse judgment in an action brought by individual plaintiffs
against the same defendant.8 7 In the prior action, thirty-six AfricanAmerican employees of Pemco, a military airplane and repair facility,
filed an action against their employer pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981,88
alleging various forms of racial harassment and race discrimination.
Thereafter, the EEOC brought its own Title VII action, alleging a
racially hostile work environment on behalf of 200 or more of Pemco's
African-American employees. In the individual action, the jury found for
defendant on all claims. Thereafter, the district court granted Pemco's
motion for summary judgment with respect to the EEOC's suit, finding
that the suit was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel.8 9
On appeal, because there were different parties involved in the two
actions, the primary issue before the Eleventh Circuit was whether the
EEOC was considered to be in "privity" with the various plaintiffs in the
private discrimination action.9 ° The court considered two possible types
of privity: "[(1)] the theory of 'virtual representation,' [and] [(2)] 'control'
over the previous litigation."9 The court noted that the following four
factors determined whether there was virtual representation: "[Wihether there was '[(1)] participation in the first litigation, [(2)] apparent
consent to be bound, [(3)] apparent tactical maneuvering, [and] [(4)] close
relationships between the parties and nonparties.', 92 The Eleventh
Circuit determined that the only factor partially present in this case was
the EEOC's limited participation in the private litigation because the
parties conducted joint discovery and because the EEOC attorney sat in
the audience section of the courtroom during the trial.9 3 Accordingly,
the court of appeals concluded that the individual plaintiffs were not

85. Id.
86. 383 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2004).
87. Id. at 1283.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
89. 383 F.3d at 1283-84.
90. Id. at 1286.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1287 (citations omitted).
93. Id.
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"virtual representatives" of the EEOC, and therefore, were not in
privity.94 Likewise, the court of appeals concluded there was no
evidence the EEOC had effectively controlled the litigation conducted by
the private plaintiffs.95 On the basis of these conclusions, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for
further proceedings.96
97
In Bishop v. Birmingham Police Department,
the Eleventh Circuit
again reaffirmed its prior holdings that the findings of a state administrative agency do not have preclusive effect on a party in a subsequent
Title VII action. 98 Plaintiff's discharge by the City of Birmingham was
upheld by the Jefferson County Personnel Board, an independent state
agency. In plaintiff's subsequent employment discrimination action
against the city, the district court ruled that the Personnel Board's
findings were entitled to preclusive effect over plaintiff's Title VII action.
The court relied upon the Eleventh Circuit's prior decision in Travers v.
Jones.9 9 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the district court
had failed to recognize that Travers involved a claim pursuant to
§ 1983,100 and on the basis of clearly established precedent, "a different
result is required for Title VII claims."'0 '
C.

ProceduralMatters

1. Class Actions. In Cooper v. Southern Co.,102 the Eleventh
Circuit re-emphasized just how difficult it is to maintain a Title VII class
0 3
action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiffs, seven current and former employees of defendants' companies,
brought a Title VII class action challenging defendants' promotion and
compensation practices because of perceived race discrimination. The
proposed class included approximately 2400 individuals working in four
states (Georgia, Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi) and working for all
four of defendants' companies, the Southern Company (the corporate
holding company of the other defendants), Georgia Power Company (an
electrical utility), Southern Company Energy Solutions (a non-utility

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 1288.
Id.
Id. at 1295.
361 F.3d 607 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 610.
Id. at 609; 323 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 984 (Nov. 3, 2003).
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Bishop, 361 F.3d at 610.
390 F.3d 695 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 702-03; FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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subsidiary developing for-sale energy-related products and services), and
Southern Company Services (a subsidiary providing human resource and
administrative services to the other companies). The district court
denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification and entered separate
orders in favor of defendants with respect to each of the seven named
plaintiffs' claims.'"
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, plaintiffs alleged that the district
court had abused its discretion in denying class certification. 10 5 The
Eleventh Circuit disagreed after a "painstaking review of the record."" 6 Initially, "plaintiffs argue[d] that the district court erred by
improperly 'reaching the merits' of the plaintiffs' [individual] claims" at
the class certification stage.0 7 However, the Eleventh Circuit noted
that the district court was "obliged to make some preliminary assessment" of plaintiffs' individual claims to determine whether plaintiffs'
claims were common to the members of the proposed class."S With
respect to the named plaintiffs, the court of appeals noted that only four
plaintiffs remained employed with defendants." 9 Of those four, all
had been employed in the Atlanta area for most or all of their employment and none had worked in the rural areas of Georgia, Florida,
Mississippi, or Alabama."0 With respect to the typicality requirement,
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that while the "named plaintiffs may
have had claims that were typical of some conceivable sub-groups of the
overall class, the seven named plaintiffs, collectively, did not have claims
that would have been typical of the entire class.""' With regard to the
commonality requirement, the court of appeals again held that the
named plaintiffs clearly did not suffer from issues common to the
members of the entire class because compensation and promotion
decisions were made by "different managers in different companies
implementing different policies."112 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit
court had not abused its discretion in denying class
held that the district
3
certification. "

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Cooper, 390 F.3d at 702-03.
Id. at 702.
Id.
Id. at 712.
Id. at 713.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 706-07, 715.
Id. at 715.
Id.
Id. at 719.
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2. Jury Verdicts. The issue before the court in Wilbur v. Correctional Services Corp.1 14 was the dilemma of an inconsistency between
a jury's general verdict and the jury's answers to special interrogatories."5 Plaintiff brought a Title VII action against defendant, Correctional Services Corporation, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation.
The district court submitted a ten question special interrogatory verdict
form to the jury. In its responses to the special interrogatory, the jury
answered "no" to the question of whether plaintiff had been subjected to
a hostile or abusive work environment. The jury also answered "no" to
the questions of whether plaintiff had been terminated because of her
rejection of a quid pro quo sexual demand or threat or because she had
asserted claims or complaints of gender discrimination. Notwithstanding
these responses, the jury awarded plaintiff $25,000 in response to the
final interrogatory addressing the issue of damages. The district court
granted defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law, ruling that
the jury's award of damages was inconsistent with the remainder of the
verdict.16
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court, despite
plaintiff's creative but strained attempts to support the jury's award of
damages." 7
The court of appeals concluded that no reasonable
construction of the jury's answers to the special interrogatories could
reconcile those answers with the jury's damages award."' Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision." 9
3. Waiver. In Chappell v. Chao,"2 the Eleventh Circuit addressed
the appeal options of a federal employee when asserting a claim
pursuant to Title VII.' 2' Plaintiff had filed several administrative
complaints of race and age discrimination and retaliation with the
Department of Labor's Equal Employment Office ("EEO") and had
requested a hearing with the EEOC. While his EEO complaints were
pending and his EEOC request was being considered, plaintiff was
terminated from his position after he failed to meet the requirements of
a Performance Improvement Plan. Plaintiff appealed his termination to
the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"). Before the MSPB,

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

393 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1199.
Id. at 1196-99.
Id. at 1205.
Id. at 1203.
Id. at 1205.
388 F.3d 1373 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1374.
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plaintiff challenged his termination, in part, on the basis of discrimination and retaliation. Thereafter, the EEOC rendered a determination
that plaintiff had not made an adequate showing to establish his
discrimination claims and issued a right to sue within ninety days of a
decision made by the EEOC. Following plaintiff's filing of a Title VII
action in federal court, the MSPB appeals board issued a final order
upholding plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff then elected to appeal the
MSPB decision to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. The Federal
Circuit upheld the merits of plaintiff's termination and dismissed his
appeal. The district court then granted summary judgment for the
agency on plaintiff's federal court122action, ruling that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the case.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit, in a case of first impression, adopted
the position of the Federal Circuit and held "a federal employee who
wants to preserve both discrimination and non-discrimination claims
after a final order from the MSPB must do so by bringing all his related
claims in federal district court." 12 The Eleventh Circuit concluded
that plaintiff had waived his right to pursue his discrimination action in
district court by electing to appeal his termination claim to the Federal
Circuit. 124
D.

Remedies Under Title VII-Consent Decrees

Making its sixth journey to the Eleventh Circuit was Reynolds v.
McInnes (Reynolds VI).125 This long-standing employment discrimination class action was originally brought in 1985 by a class of AfricanAmerican employees and applicants against the Alabama Department
of Transportation ("ALDOT"). In 1994 the district court allowed a group
of white ALDOT employees to intervene in the case for purposes of
challenging the race-conscious aspects of a proposed consent decree in
the case. In March 1994 the district court also approved a consent
decree incorporating certain supposedly race-neutral reclassification
procedures for all employees working for ALDOT. Thereafter, the
interveners filed a motion with the district court seeking to have ALDOT
held in contempt for not complying with the race-neutral aspects of the
reclassification provisions of the consent decree. The district court
referred the interveners' motion to a special master, and the original
class of plaintiffs appealed this referral to the Eleventh Circuit.'26

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 1374-76.
Id. at 1378.
Id.
380 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1305-07.
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted that no prior Supreme Court or
Eleventh Circuit case had specifically decided whether a party, "once
allowed to intervene for purposes of challenging some or all of the
provisions of a consent decree, then has standing to seek enforcement of
that decree against parties clearly bound by it."1 27 The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the
interveners in this case were clearly within the "'zone of interests"' that
the consent decree "was designed to protect."128

II.
A.

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

Reverse Discrimination

During this survey period, the Supreme Court further clarified the
scope of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")' 29 in
General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline.'o The Court held that
this law does not necessarily prohibit employers from favoring older
workers over younger ones, so long as the younger workers are under
age forty.' 3' The Court concluded that the ADEA only forbids discriminatory preference for the young over the old.13 2 The Court rejected the
EEOC's argument that its interpretation of the Act should be given
deference. 3 '
The Court granted certiorari in the case to resolve a conflict among
The Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's
the circuits on this question.'
holding that the protections of the ADEA applied whenever age was a
factor in decision-making.3 5 Resorting to a review of the ADEA's
legislative history, the Court observed that the focus of the Act's drafters
was on the "unjustified assumptions about the effect of age on the ability
to work" and was intended to protect those over age forty against
discrimination.3 6 Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy dissented,

127. Id. at 1307.
128. Id. at 1308 (citing Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 625 F.2d 33, 34 (5th Cir.
1980)).
129. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
130. 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
131. Id. at 601.
132. Id. at 600. The EEOC had filed an amicus brief supporting the position taken by
Cline and the other named plaintiffs that the prohibition works both ways. Id. at 594 &
n.6. See Hamilton v. Caterpillar Inc., 966 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1992); Schuler v. Polaroid
Corp., 848 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1988).
133. Gen. Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 600.
134. Id. at 586.
135. Id. See Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2002).
136. 540 U.S. at 588.
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contrary opinion of the EEOC should have been
concluding that 1the
37
given deference.

B. Pretext and the ADEA
Conroy v. Abraham Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc.138 gave the Eleventh
Circuit an occasion to decide the application of the pretext instruction in
the ADEA context. 139 The appeal also gave the panel an opportunity
to conclude "that 'after-acquired evidence cannot be used as the basis for
[justifying an] employment decision"' challenged under the ADEA. 40
By affirming the district court's rulings on both the evidentiary and jury
instruction issues, the court of appeals affirmed the jury verdict below
for the employer.' 4 1
Of most significance was the court's ruling on the pretext instruction. "4' 2 The panel concluded that the Supreme Court decision in
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,"4 did not alter the law
of the circuit with respect to the instruction.'" The court of appeals
had previously concluded in Palmer v. Board ofRegents of the University
System of Georgia 4 5 that a district court's failure to give the type of
46
pretext instruction sought by Conroy in this case was not error.
Conroy asserted, on appeal, that Reeves changed matters.'4 7 The court
of appeals disagreed, rejecting Conroy's contention that Reeves requires
a pretext instruction be given to a jury in employment discrimination
cases. 4 ' The panel concluded that the Supreme Court was dealing
with the question of the sufficiency of the evidence and not the necessity
of a particular jury instruction. 14 "Reeves therefore did nothing to
change the law in the Eleventh Circuit-both before and after Reeves, a
jury has been permitted to infer discrimination if it disbelieves the
employer's stated reasons for termination." 5 ° A specific pretext

137. Id. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. 375 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2004).
139. Id. at 1229.
140. Id. at 1232 (quoting Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1068 n.101 (11th
Cir. 2000)).
141. Id. at 1235.
142. Id. at 1233.
143. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
144. Conroy, 375 F.3d at 1233.
145. 208 F.3d 969 (11th Cir. 2000).
146. Id. at 975.
147. Conroy, 375 F.3d at 1233.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148) (internal citations omitted).
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instruction is not necessary.151 The Eleventh Circuit recognized that
some circuits began requiring trial courts to include a pretext instruction
in their jury charges after the decision in Reeves. 5 2 The court of
appeals, however, determined that Reeves did not govern that question. "' Accordingly, Palmer is still binding precedent in this circuit.
C.

Administrative Requirements

During this survey period, a panel concluded that an EEOC intake
questionnaire did not satisfy the statutory requirements for an
5
In Bost v. Federal Express
administrative charge under the ADEA.5'
55
Corp.,' the court concluded that an intake questionnaire and supporting affidavit did not satisfy the requirement for the timely filing of an
EEOC charge because the documents clearly stated that they are only
for "pre-charge filing counseling."156 Bost had attempted to piggyback
his age discrimination cause of action onto an earlier administrative
charge he had filed against Federal Express."' The court concluded
that the earlier charge had been defective because it had not been timely
filed or properly perfected. 55 The panel, therefore, determined that
Bost's attempt to piggyback was unsuccessful. 59
In another piggybacking case, Stone v. First Union Corp.,"60 the
panel reversed a district court finding on class representation issues. 6 '
This decision contained a fairly illuminating discussion of the impairment criterion6 2for intervention as of right in employment discrimination
class actions.
Subsequent history evolved in a case we reported in last year's survey
article, settling a question of Alabama discrimination law.6 3 Last year
in a collateral proceeding in Jones v. Dillard's, Inc.,'6' the court of
appeals certified a question to the Alabama Supreme Court concerning

151.

Id. at 1234.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 1233 n.5.
Id. at 1234.
Bost v. Fed. Express Corp., 372 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2004).
372 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1241.
Id. at 1236.

158. Id. at 1241.
159. Id.

160.
161.
162.
a class
163.

371 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1307.
Id. at 1309-11 (discussing the impairment criteria for intervention as of right in
action).
See Peter Reed Corbin & John E. Duvall, Employment Discrimination,54 MERCER

L. REV. 1175, 1191 (2004).
164. 368 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2004).
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the proper statute of limitations period to apply to claims arising under
the Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act.165 During the
2004 survey period, the Alabama Supreme Court answered the certified
question, holding that the limitations period under the Alabama statute
is identical to the limitations period under the federal ADEA. 166 As a
result of this answer, the panel vacated entry of summary judgment for
the employer on the former employee's federal and state ADEA claims
and remanded the case to the district court for further proceeding.1 "7
III.

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

During the survey period, the Supreme Court decided only one
significant Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 168 case, 69 while
the court of appeals handed down three noteworthy decisions during
In Tennessee v. Lane, 7 ' the Supreme Court held that Title
2004.17
II of the ADA 72 applied to cases implicating fundamental rights of
access to the courts and was valid under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution as applied to that state.7 3 The Court
in Lane concluded that in enacting Title II, Congress intended to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity for the states in cases
implicating the right of access to the courts.' 74 Although not an
employment decision, this decision is useful to employment practitioners
in understanding the Court's view of at least this aspect of the legislative history of the ADA.
More directly on the employment law front, the court of appeals issued
three decisions during the survey period worthy of mention.
In Rossbach v. City of Miami,7' the court addressed the nettlesome
question of light-duty assignments for individuals claiming to be
disabled under the ADA. 7 6 Several City of Miami police officers
claimed that the city's policy precluding light and limited duty officers

165. See Jones v. Dillard's, Inc., 331 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2003).
166. Jones, 368 F.3d at 1279.
167. Id.
168. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113 (2000).
169. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
170. Rossbach v. City of Miami, 371 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 2004); Cleveland v. Home
Shopping Network, 369 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 2004); Caruthers v. BSA Adver., Inc., 357 F.3d
1213 (11th Cir. 2004).
171. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).

172.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113.

173.
174.
175.
176.

Lane, 541 U.S. at 533-34.
Id.
371 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1355-56.
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from engaging in off-duty jobs unlawfully discriminated against them on
the basis of their disabilities. The district court had earlier found that
each of the individual plaintiffs failed to establish that they were
disabled under the ADA. 177 The court of appeals affirmed, concluding
that plaintiffs were each only moderately impaired as a result of various
medical conditions and that none of them suffered from the disabling
conditions required to invoke the ADA's protections. 7 ' Although each
police officer had indeed been classified as "disabled" by the city for
purposes of the city's light and limited duty policy, the court of appeals
held that classification for purposes of that local policy did not render
the officers disabled for ADA purposes.
In Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc.,' the court of appeals
appears to have finally settled the question of when a court should
revisit whether plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination
after defendant puts forth a legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation of
its challenged employment action at trial. 8' The court specifically
held that: "After a trial on the merits, an appeals court should not
revisit whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case." 82
In Caruthersv. BSA Advertising, Inc.,"18 the court weighed the often
difficult issue of determining whether an employer has regarded an
individual as disabled for ADA purposes.8 4 The panel affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment for the employer, noting that
in this particular case there was no evidence in the record from which
to conclude that BSA had considered Caruthers to be substantially
88
limited in a major life activity simply because of his hand strain.
IV.
A.

CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS OF 1866

Section 1981

Perhaps the only significant § 1981186 decision rendered during this
survey period concerned the proper statute of limitations to be applied

177.

Id.

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 1359.
Id. at 1360-61.
369 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1194.
Id.
357 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1215.
Id. at 1218.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
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to such actions. In Jones v. R.R. Donnely & Sons Co.,"87 the Supreme
Court finally concluded that the federal catch-all limitations period was
applicable to § 1981 actions. 8 Prior to this decision, § 1981 actions
borrowed limitations periods from state statutes, resulting in varying
statutes of limitation for similar causes of action around the country.' 89
As a result of the decision in Jones, a four year limitations period now
applies to these actions. 190
In Cooper v. Southern Co., ' a case with a long history in the circuit,
the court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision denying class
certification.'92 The decision extensively reviewed the current decisional law in the circuit regarding class actions and is a useful class
reference on the multitude of issues presented in such attempted claims.
V. CONCLUSION
Inexplicably, the number of noteworthy employment decisions
rendered by the federal courts during the survey period was again down
from past years. Conversely, the importance of the issues being decided
continued to be high.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

541 U.S. 369 (2004).
Id. at 382-83.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 382-83.
390 F.3d 695 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 745,

